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Managing the Risks of Corporate Fraud: the Evidence From Hong Kong And Singapore 
Abstract: Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Hong Kong and Singapore have 
implemented reforms that promote independence and monitoring competency of the boards of 
directors of their listed companies. However, with the advent of the financial crisis of 
2007/2008, a wave of fraud cases prompts the question as to the effectiveness of these reforms. 
Analysing a sample of 62 listed companies which are fraudulent between 2007 and 2014, and 
comparing against a matched sample of non-fraudulent firms, we find that the fraud companies 
tend to combine the roles of chairman and chief executive officer and have fewer non-
accounting finance experts on their boards. They are also likely to be overseas mainland 
Chinese firms. Analysing the specific case studies of fraud, the reasons for the lack of 
effectiveness in the independent directors in preventing fraud are likely due to the difficulties 
in obtaining access to information in approving conflicted transactions, low threat of 
enforcement actions, their incentives to side with controlling shareholders and the challenges 
in regulating foreign listings.  
 
Keywords: Corporate fraud, independent directors, corporate governance, foreign 
listings  
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Managing the Risks of Corporate Fraud: the Evidence from Hong Kong and Singapore  
 
1. Introduction 
The stock markets of Hong Kong and Singapore are characterised by companies with 
concentrated shareholdings. 1  In addition, they routinely attract issuers whose assets and 
businesses are outside the country of listing. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 triggered a wave 
of financial fraud cases in Hong Kong and Singapore. In particular, uncomfortable spotlight 
has been placed on P-Chips and S-Chips, which are mainland Chinese private enterprise firms 
listed in Hong Kong and Singapore respectively.  These firms are characterised not only by 
having founding shareholders or families retaining significant control but also their assets, 
businesses and their senior management are located in China (that is, outside the jurisdiction 
of listing).2 As at 2010/2011, approximately 26.2% 3 and 21.6%4 of the listed firms on Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) and Singapore Exchange (SGX) are P-Chips and S-Chips 
respectively. In Singapore, by 2011, 10% of the S-Chips were suspended from trading due to 
governance or accounting issues.5 In Hong Kong, between 2007 and 2014, a series of high 
profile fraud cases including Gome Electrical Appliances, China Forestry Holdings and China 
Metal Recycling were reported, leading to enforcement actions by the regulators.6 Worries 
about the corporate governance or accounting problems of these overseas mainland Chinese 
                                                          
1  S Claessens, S Djankov, and L Lang, ‘The separation of ownership and control in East Asian 
Corporations’ (2000) 58(1) Journal of Financial Economics 81; RW Carney and TB Child. ‘Changes to the 
Ownership and Control of East Asian Corporations Between 1996 and 2008’ (2013) 107 Journal of Financial 
Economics 494-513. 
2  Eg The Government Information Centre, ‘LCQ20: Monitoring of Mainland Private Enterprises Listed 
in Hong Kong’ (Press Release of Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, 25 April 2012) 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201204/25/P201204250418.htm> accessed 1 July 2017; SY Leu, 
‘Corporate: The Next Chapter for S-Chips’ The Edge (Hong Kong, 14 November 2011). 
3 Hong Kong Exchange, Market Statistics 2010 < 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2011/documents/110111news.pdf> 16. There were 327 
non-H share mainland Chinese private enterprises, also known as P-Chips. 
4  See SY Leu, ‘Corporate: The Next Chapter for S-Chips’, n 3. (percentage obtained by dividing 168 S-
Chips by the total number of SGX-listed firms as at December 2011 obtained from World Federation of 
Exchanges). 
5  J Kwok, ‘Are S-chips still a possible play?’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 25 December 2011).   
6  See nn 108-112. 
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listed firms are widely cited as a reason for the lacklustre performance of their stocks following 
these scandals, not only in Hong Kong and Singapore but also the overseas mainland Chinese 
listed firms in New York and Toronto.7  
These fraud cases in Hong Kong and Singapore have occurred despite the corporate 
governance reforms, largely influenced by the corporate governance code in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States (US), which are put 
in place following the Asian financial crisis of 1997. These key reforms centre on the boards 
of publicly listed companies: the promotion of greater independent board representation and 
the increase in demands on the monitoring expertise of independent directors.8 These changes 
have been adopted notwithstanding the fact that the shareholding structures of publicly listed 
companies in Hong Kong and Singapore differ markedly from the Berle and Means model of 
shareholding structures found in the US and UK.9  
Following the scandals post-financial crisis of 2007/2008, major changes (and attempts) 
have taken place in Hong Kong and Singapore to further improve, among other things, the 
governance of boards and in the case of Singapore, to target the boards of foreign listings. First, 
in Hong Kong, the requirement that one-third of the board comprises independent directors, 
which previously applied on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, was made mandatory in 2012. In 
Singapore, with effect from 2016, the Code of Corporate Governance requires half of the board 
to be independent where the chairman and CEO are the same person or are closely related, or 
where the chairman is not independent. Second, in 2009, the SGX attempted to push through, 
but not ultimately implemented, a reform that require issuers to have an independent director 
                                                          
7  E.g. R Cookson, ‘China foreign listings dogged by scandal’ Financial Times (Hong Kong, 5 June 
2011). 
8  See discussion in Section 2 below.  
9  See R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, and A Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (1999) 
54 Journal of Finance 471; Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (3rd edn, OUP 2017), p. 65 
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to sit on the boards of principal overseas subsidiaries. 10 Earlier in 2006, the SGX implemented 
a listing rule change that requires at least two of the independent directors must be resident in 
Singapore.11 
These occurrence of the wave of fraud cases post-Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 
global financial crisis of 2007/2008 raises the following questions. First, notwithstanding the 
regulatory reforms, do the fraudulent companies have board characteristics that are different 
from the non-fraudulent firms? Second, are foreign listings more likely to commit fraud as 
compared with domestic listings? A positive or negative finding to either or both of the 
questions will be relevant to determining the optimal regulatory responses in preventing future 
fraud cases. Third, why has fraud occurred among the domestic and foreign listings despite the 
fact legal reforms have purported to strengthen the independence of the boards in both 
jurisdictions?12  In answering this question, we address how public and private enforcement 
against independent directors has taken place among the fraudulent firms in the two 
jurisdictions.  
In addressing the first two questions, we hand-collect a dataset of 37 SEHK-listed and 
25 SGX-listed issuers and/or their top management which were investigated for corporate fraud 
during the 2007-2014 period, and 62 matched pairs control group of firms with similar size, 
exchange listing and industry, and were not alleged or found to be fraudulent between the 2007-
2016 period.13  In answering the third question, we have expanded our database to include all 
                                                          
10  SGX, ‘Consultation Paper: Proposed Amendments to the Listing Rules’ (9 December 2009) 
<http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/334ec200409aaac1bc08ffe7608732c1/Consultation_Paper_Proposed_
Amendments_to_the_Listing_Rules_to_Strengthen_Corporate_Governance+Practice_20091209.pdf?MOD=AJ
PERES> accessed 1 July 2017. 
11 SGX Listing Rules Amendments 2006, Listing Rule 221. 
12  In the US, independent directors have not demonstrated to prevent large scandals. E.g. in the case of 
Enron, the board comprises a majority of independent directors. See JC Coffee, Gatekeepers: The Role of the 
Professions in Corporate Governance (OUP 2006). 
13  The sample is not confined to P-Chips and S-Chips only but includes all of the firms found to be 
fraudulent, unless excluded, as explained in Section 3.3 below.  
 6 
 
 
of the public and private enforcement actions between the 2005-2016 period, as explained in 
Section 6 below.  
Adapting from the definitions of fraud used in Ang et al14 and Beasley,15 we define 
fraud broadly as occurrences where: 
(a) The top management has committed misappropriation of assets and/or cash; the top 
management being the executive directors, chief executive officer (CEO), chief 
financial officer or treasurer;  
(b) The company had issued materially misleading financial statements or materially 
delayed in disclosing financial statements; or 
(c) The company had disclosed materially misleading information disclosures or materially 
delayed the disclosure of material information. 
We focus on the above events of fraud as they are comparatively rare and serious events 
in the life-cycles of the firms. Misappropriation of assets and/or cash constitute offences in 
Hong Kong and Singapore.16 In fact, the greatest threats faced by minority shareholders in 
concentrated shareholding systems is the tunnelling of assets by the controlling shareholders. 
Issuing misleading financial statements or other information disclosures or delay in disclosure 
of material information constitute criminal offences in Hong Kong and Singapore, and can lead 
to enforcement actions against the listed firm or its officers.17 Similarly, material delay in the 
                                                          
14  JS Ang, Z Jiang and C Wu , ‘Good Apples, Bad Apples: Sorting Among Chinese Companies Traded in 
the U.S’ (2016) 134(4) Journal of Business Ethics 611. 
15  MS Beasley, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and 
Financial Statement Fraud’ (1996) 71(4) The Accounting Review 443. 
16  Singapore Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 rev ed) Chapter XVII; Hong Kong Theft Ordinance LN 124 of 
1970 (Cap 210) s 16A (fraud) and s 9 (theft). 
17  In Singapore, a delay of release of material information is a breach of the listing rules and which is 
statutorily backed under s 203 of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 rev ed) (SFA). In Hong Kong, 
the obligation of continuous disclosure of material information under the listing rules has statutory backing 
under s 307B of the Securities and Futures Ordinance LN12 (SFO) of 2003 since 2013.  Additionally, for 
companies incorporated in Hong Kong and Singapore, the respective company legislation provides that is an 
offence to fail to prepare financial statements or lay before the general meeting (e.g. s 379 and 429 of the HK 
Companies Ordinance; ss 201 and 204 of the Singapore Companies Act). 
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issuance of financial reporting can lead to enforcement actions instituted by SEHK 18 or SGX.19 
In the US and UK, the making of false and misleading statements (or dishonest disclosure) are 
often linked to the managers’ incentives to maximise the stock prices due to incentive-based 
compensation and/or to prevent the companies from going into insolvency;20 in concentrated 
shareholding systems, the motivations of errant controlling shareholders (who control the 
boards) to mask the true performance of the company are not very different; for example, as 
explained below, the fortunes of these companies are often closely tied to that of their 
controlling shareholders.21 
When we compare the differences in the board characteristics between the fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent companies, we find that there are not many differences between the two 
groups; there is no difference in the proportion of independent directors (whether on the boards 
or their audit committees), the board size or whether the largest shareholder is also the CEO, 
Chairman or founder. However, there is some evidence the fraudulent firms are more likely to 
have same person occupying the same role of CEO and Chairman than the non-fraudulent 
firms. 22  We further find that there is a difference in the financial expertise of the audit 
committees; fraudulent firms have fewer persons with non-accounting financial expertise, as 
compared with the non-fraudulent firms. In particular, disclosure-fraud companies have fewer 
persons with non-accounting financial expertise than the matched firms. We also find that 
                                                          
18  SEHK listing rules, rules 13.46(1)(a) and 13.49(1); SEHK reserves its rights to take appropriate actions 
against the company and/or its directors in respect of the breach; further under rule 13.50 of the SEHK listing 
rules, the trading of an issuer’s securities will normally be suspended if the issuer fails to publish periodic 
financial information in accordance with the listing rules. The suspension will normally remain in force until the 
issuer publishes in the newspapers the requisite financial information.)  
19  SGX listing rules, rule 705; breach of the SGX listing rules is subject to enforcement proceedings by 
the SGX under chapter 14 of the SGX listing rules. 
20  See JH Arlen and WJ Carney, “Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and 
Evidence” (1992) 1992 University of Illinois Law Review 691. 
21  See nn 97-98 below (and accompanying text).  
22  See nn 81-82 and accompanying text. 
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regardless of the country of incorporation, a significant proportion of fraudulent firms in each 
of Hong Kong and Singapore are overseas mainland Chinese enterprise firms.  
We proceed to offer lessons and implications of the results of our findings. First, on our 
finding that fraudulent firms are more likely to have CEO/Chairman duality, while we note that 
CEO/Chairman duality can be present in well-run firms, such characteristic is of concern if 
there are significant conflicted transactions entered into between the listed company and such 
persons. When we review all of the fraud cases in our sample, we find that a significant 
proportion of the cases deal with problematic related party transactions (RPTs) (45.2%), which 
encompass outright misappropriation of assets and also payments or provision of benefits to 
controlling shareholders for goods or services that are neither properly approved (whether by 
the board or by shareholders) nor properly disclosed.  Even though company law and the listing 
rules in Hong Kong and Singapore regard independent directors as important gatekeepers and 
their approvals are required in order for the RPTs to proceed,23 as we explain in Section 5 
below, many of these transactions are not brought to the attention of the boards in the first place.  
Second, where the errant directors or managers are located outside the jurisdiction of 
listing, and the cooperation of the foreign regulatory authorities is not necessarily forthcoming, 
the independent directors and listing jurisdictions’ regulators have limited powers to prevent 
fraud or when fraud occurs, to take enforcement proceedings.  
Finally, we address the reasons why fraud has continued to occur among the domestic 
and foreign listings despite the legal reforms that strengthen the independence of the boards. 
In reviewing the fraud cases, we find that independent directors have a low, though not zero, 
                                                          
23  See C Chen, W Zhang and WY Wan, ‘Board Independence as a Panacea to Tunneling? An Empirical 
Study of Related Party Transactions in Hong Kong and Singapore’, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991423. See Section 5.1 below on the safeguards to the 
minority shareholders in respect of RPTs in Hong Kong and Singapore.  
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risk of being held liable for failure of oversight in preventing fraud. In the fraudulent cases 
where public enforcement actions are instituted against the errant directors, the majority of 
actions are taken against executive directors. However, there are signs that the position may be 
changing in Hong Kong and independent directors have recently been targeted in enforcement 
actions for breach of the duty of oversight or care.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature on comparative corporate governance in the 
following ways. First, the differences in corporate governance characteristics among the 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies shed light on the suitability of regulatory framework 
that governs the listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore. These two countries have 
highly concentrated shareholdings among its listed firms, which is in stark contrast to the 
companies in the Western countries (particularly, the US and the UK), and the appropriate 
regulatory response to control fraud may differ from that found in the West.  Second, our study 
highlights the problems that are faced by regulators in jurisdictions whose stock exchanges 
have significant proportions of foreign listings. Our findings should be of interest to policy-
makers and stock exchanges seeking to attract foreign issuers and are relevant in the UK, given 
that the Financial Conduct Authority has recently consulted on whether to have an international 
listing segment for overseas companies.24  
There are limitations to the current study. First, we can only examine cases where fraud 
has been found against the listed firms as reported in the case law, regulatory actions or major 
financial press.  Hence, the level of fraud cases may be under-stated. However, our research 
shows that even if the level of fraud is under-stated, the available evidence shows the 
                                                          
24  Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Review of the Effectiveness of Primary Markets: The UK Primary 
Markets Landscape: Discussion Paper D17/2’ (14 February 2017) < 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp17-02.pdf > accessed 1 July 2017. 
 10 
 
 
limitations of boards in preventing corporate fraud. Second, we have not independently 
investigated the issue of whether the directors who are declared to be independent by the boards 
of the companies in our dataset size are in fact otherwise free from material conflicts of interests 
or have additional ties to the controlling shareholders and/or management.25 This will require 
an examination of the business, family or other relationship with the controlling shareholder or 
management to make the determination, of which we do not have comprehensive information 
except possibly in the situations where the matter has gone to litigation. However, our key point 
is that, even without the ties to the controllers, independent directors serving on boards of 
companies with controlling shareholders are limited in their effectiveness. Third, it is outside 
the scope of our current study to examine the effectiveness of external ‘gatekeepers’, such as 
auditors, sponsors and external legal counsel, in preventing corporate fraud.26 This has to be 
the subject of further research.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part 2 sets out the literature review and 
the theoretical framework for managing risks of corporate fraud. Part 3 outlines the regulatory 
reforms in Hong Kong and Singapore post-Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the wave of fraud 
cases that are discovered post-global financial crisis of 2007/2008. Part 4 sets out our findings 
the differences in corporate governance characteristics and foreign listings. Part 5 sets out the 
explanations for our results, lessons and implications of our findings. Part 6 deals with the 
threats of enforcement and incentives to monitor by the independent directors. Part 7 concludes.  
 
                                                          
25  In this regard, we note that until the 2012 amendments to the Code of Corporate Governance, 
Singapore’s definition of independent directors in the Corporate Governance Code has not precluded links with 
the substantial shareholders (defined as holding 10% or more). Since 2005, Hong Kong’s definition of 
independent directors in its listing rules explicitly provide that there should be independence from the 
substantial shareholders (defined as holding 10% or more). See also D Puchniak and LL Lan, ‘Independent 
Directors in Singapore: Puzzling Compliance Requiring Explanation’ American Journal of Comparative Law 
(forthcoming) < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2604067> accessed 14 July 2017. 
26  See eg JC Coffee n 12.   
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2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework for Managing Risks of Corporate 
Fraud  
2.1 Corporate Governance Characteristics  
One important reform that dominates corporate governance practices of publicly listed 
companies in the West and Asia relates to the governance by the boards of directors. 27  In the 
US, independent directors have been appointed since the 1970s but gained much more 
significance after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was enacted in 
response to scandals such as Enron and Worldcom at the beginning of the century. The 
legislation mandated audit committees comprising entirely independent directors28 and the 
amendments to the stock exchange regulations also require the listed companies to have a 
majority of independent directors, and at least one of the directors on the audit committee must 
have accounting or related financial management expertise.29 By 2013, 85% of the directors 
were independent and 60% of all listed firms have super-majority boards.30  
In the UK, Cadbury Report was instrumental in the promotion of non-executive 
independent directors31 and this had significant impact on Singapore and Hong Kong, though 
there are some variations. Since 2006, the UK Combined Code (predecessor to the current 
Corporate Governance Code) provides that at least half of the boards of listed companies 
                                                          
27  See KJ Hopt ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation’ 
(2011) 59 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
28  Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, s 301. 
29  The listed company's board will interpret such qualification in its business judgment e.g. see New York 
Stock Exchange listing rules, rules 3.10(1) and 310.A. < http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCM/> accessed 1 July 2017; 
See Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (3rd edn, OUP 
2017)  63. 
30  See U Velikonja, ‘The Political Economy of Board Independence’ (2014) 92 North Carolina Law 
Review 855, 857. Super-majority boards are boards where there is only one insider (usually the CEO) on the 
board. 
31  A Cadbury, Report of the Committee of the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1 December 
1992)  
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should comprise independent non-executive directors, except for the smaller companies.32 
Mirroring the situation in the US, in the 2000s, the UK has 90% of independent directors on 
the boards of listed companies, though that number has fallen to 60% by 2011 as a result of the 
Walker Review.33 Insofar as the division of responsibility between the chairman and CEO is 
concerned, such division has been dominant since the 1990s, and is the norm among the FTSE 
350 boards.34 
 
However, have independent directors been effective, particularly in preventing fraud? 
The existing empirical evidence on the effects of board governance on firm performance is 
very controversial, largely because of the endogeneity issues that arise in the choice of 
corporate governance characteristics. 35  No less controversial is also the issue of whether 
corporate governance characteristics is effective on preventing fraud. The existing academic 
literature on US listed companies (which are predominantly widely-held companies) shows 
mixed evidence on the role of independent directors in preventing corporate fraud. Using data 
from SEC registered firms, Beasley has found that a higher proportion of outside directors 
significantly reduces the likelihood of financial statement fraud (defined as where management 
intentionally issues materially misleading financial statement information and 
misappropriation of assets by top management) but the presence of an audit committee does 
                                                          
32  See H Baum, S Kozuka, LR Nottage, and DW Puchniak, ‘The Rise of the Independent Director: A 
Historical and Comparative Perspective’, (2016) Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 16/20, fn 2, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814978 > accessed 1 July 2017. 
33  See Baum et al, ibid, above; see Sir David Walker, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks 
and Other Financial Industry Entities’ (UK Government Web Archive, 26 November 2009) < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> 
accessed 1 July 2017. The Walker Review was published in 2009 as a reaction to the global financial crisis and 
places emphasis on board competence (and not merely board independence). 
34  MT Moore, ‘United Kingdom: The Scope and Dynamics of Corporate Governance Regulation’ in 
Andreas M Fleckner and Klaus J Hopts (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and 
International Analysis, (Cambridge University Press 2013) 913-956. 
35  Eg see Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term 
firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law 27:231–73. See literature discussed in Knyazeva, Anzhela, 
Knyazeva, Diana, & Masulis, Ronald W. (2013). The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561-1605. 
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not have such effect.36 Firms that experience financial statement fraud are also more likely to 
have larger boards. 37  Agrawal and Chadha find that there is an insignificant correlation 
between board/audit committee independence and earnings restatements. 38  More recent 
literature documents that firm transparency improves with increases in board independence, 
thus reducing information costs within the firm. 39 
Similarly, the evidence on CEO/chairman duality in preventing fraud is mixed Recent 
scholarship on US data has found that while CEO/chairman duality has a significant negative 
impact on firm performance, such effects are positively moderated by board independence.40 
In the case of the scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, they were characterised by the firm’s 
domination by a single individual or small group.41 Dechow et al have found that fraud was 
more likely in firms where there is CEO/chairman duality and whose boards are dominated by 
management.42 Ang et al have found that in a sample of fraudulent and no-fraud Chinese listed 
firms on the US market firms, the fraudulent firms are more likely to have CEO/chairman 
duality and are more likely not to have audit committees.43 On the other hand, Uzun et al find 
that CEO/chairman duality and size of the board were not significantly related to a finding of 
corporate fraud; instead, what is significant is the board had a high percentage of independent 
outside directors.44  
                                                          
36  Beasley, n 15. 
37  Ibid. 
38  A Agrawal and S Chadha, ‘Corporate governance and accounting scandals’ (2005) 48(2) The Journal 
of Law and Economics 371. 
39  CS Armstrong, JE Core, WR Guay, ‘Do independent directors cause improvements in firm 
transparency?’ (2014) 113 Journal of Financial Economics, 383. 
40 Duru A, Iyengar R J, & Zampelli, E M ‘The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance: The moderating role of board independence’  (2016) 69 Journal of Business 
Research 4269.  
41  GP Miller, ‘Catastrophic Financial Failures: Enron and More’ (2004) 89(2) Cornell Law Review 423, 
435. 
42  PM Dechow, RG Sloan, and AP Sweeney, Cases and Consequences of Earnings Manipulations: An 
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC’ (1996) 13(1) Contemporary Accounting 
Research 1. 
43  JS Ang et al, n 14. 
44  H Uzun, SH Szewczyk and R Varma, ‘Board Composition and Corporate Fraud’ (2004) 60(3) 
Financial Analysts Journal 33. 
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As is the case of the effect of board composition, the effectiveness of audit committees 
in preventing fraud is controversial. Before audit committees were mandated by stock 
exchanges, US studies show that firms engaged in fraud (as indicated by SEC enforcement 
actions) are less likely to have audit committees.45 Klein has found that there is a negative 
relationship between the independence of audit committees and abnormal accruals, being a 
proxy of earnings management.46 In relation to the requirement to have financial expertise of 
audit committees, the studies on the benefits of financial experts on audit committees is, 
however, mixed.47 For example, Abbott et al find a significant negative association between 
restatements and an audit committee with one financial expert, with similar findings for fraud.48 
Similarly, Hoitash et al find that accounting and supervisory expertise on audit committees is 
associated with lower likelihood of material weakness disclosure under s 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.49 In contrast, Badolato et al find that financial expertise is insufficient to deter 
financial irregularities unless the audit committee has higher status relative to management, in 
the form of higher ability, and commanding more authority.50 Using Singapore data, Kusnadi 
et al finds that financial reporting quality is higher if audit committees have mixed expertise in 
accounting, finance and/or supervisory, based on a sample of 423 Singapore-listed 
companies.51 Kusnadi et al draws the distinction between accounting financial experts and 
finance experts. The former are certified public accountants (CPAs) or with prior work 
                                                          
45   PM Dechow, RG Sloan, and AP Sweeney, n 42 above. 
46  A Klein, ‘Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management.’ (2002) 
33(3) Journal of Accounting and Economics 375. 
47  Under the SEC rules, financial experts are defined very widely to include not only accounting experts 
but also finance experts, that is, such as commercial bankers, investment bankers and corporate finance 
professionals: Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (24 January 2003) < https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm> accessed 1 
July 2017. 
48  LJ Abbott, S Parkers, and GF Peters, ‘Audit Committee Characteristics and Restatements’ (2004) 23(1) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 69. 
49  U Hoitash, R Hoitash, and JC Bedard ‘Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting: A Comparison of Regulatory Regimes’ (2009) 84(3) The Accounting Review 839. 
50  PG Badolato, DC Donelson, and M Ege, ‘Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings 
Management: The Role of Status’ (2014) 58 (2-3) Journal of Accounting and Economics 208. 
51  Y Kusnadi, KS Leong, T Suwardy, and Jiwei Wang, ‘Audit Committees and Financial Reporting 
Quality in Singapore’ (2016) 139(1) Journal of Business Ethics 197. 
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experience as chief financial officers (CFO), vice president of finance, financial controllers, or 
any other major accounting positions.  The latter are those with prior work experience as 
investment bankers, chief investment officers, financial analysts, or any other corporate finance 
role. 
Even if a strong independent element on the boards are regarded as important in the US 
and the UK in controlling fraud, the question remains as to whether their experiences be 
generalised to Hong Kong and Singapore, which is the subject-matter of our study. In particular, 
the securities markets of Hong Kong and Singapore are quite different from the US and the 
UK, in that they are dominated by concentrated shareholdings. Can independent directors 
continue to function effectively in such an environment? Even in the US, controlled companies 
(that is, where there is a single shareholder or group of shareholders holding more than 50% of 
the voting shares) are exempt from the listing standards regarding majority board 
independence. 52  This is a recognition that independent directors are primarily present to 
monitor the management on behalf of dispersed shareholders. Controlling shareholders can 
monitor the management themselves, and it has been argued that it is a clear indication that 
even in the US, independent directors are of limited value.53 Controlling shareholders of these 
companies have justified using non-independent directors with the requisite industry or firm 
expertise to create long-term value for shareholders. 54  In this paper, by focusing on the 
differences in the board characteristics between the fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies 
in the two jurisdictions, we can determine the optimal regulatory response to prevent fraud in 
the future.  
                                                          
52  New York Stock Exchange listing rules,  rule 303.A.00 
53   H Baum, S Kozuka, LR Nottage, and DW Puchniak, ‘The Rise of the Independent Director: A 
Historical and Comparative Perspective’, (2016) Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 16/20, fn 2, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814978 > accessed 1 July 2017. 
54  See JA Born, ‘Opting for a Controlled-Firm Majority Independent Directors Exemption to NYSE or 
NASDAQ Listing Requirements: Much Ado about Nothing?’ (2016) 17 International Journal of Financial 
Research 195, 204 
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Additionally, we are interested in whether non-accounting financial expertise on the 
audit committees is associated with lower incidence of fraud. There are very few studies on the 
impact of non-accounting expertise on audit committees in Singapore or Hong Kong, though 
there is a study on Singapore which finds that mixed expertise in accounting, finance and/or 
supervisory improves the quality of financial reporting.55 As almost all of the audit committees 
in the companies in our sample have at least one director with accounting financial expertise 
(such as being certified public accountants or having served as the chief financial officer or its 
equivalent), we are interested in the role played by the non-accounting finance experts. These 
are persons who are defined in the Guidebook on Audit Committees in Singapore 56  as 
understanding risk factors relating to the company’s operations including those relating to 
treasury operations, investment activities and financing activities. In our dataset, following 
Kusnadi,57 these persons would be investment bankers, chief investment officers, financial 
analysts or those who have had corporate finance expertise.  We hypothesise that non-
accounting finance expertise is valuable, as these experts have direct experience with analysis 
of financial statements and are able to diligently question the management and auditors about 
financial statements.58 In our study, we test whether fraudulent firms are less likely to have 
non-accounting financial experts on their audit committees, and thus lack the additional layer 
of checks that such experts will bring.  
 
2.2 Accountability of independent directors 
                                                          
55  See Kusnadi, n 51 above. 
56  Guidebook on Audit Committees in Singapore, n 85.  
57  Kusnadi, n 51 above. 
58  See also n 47; the Securities and Exchange Commission has broadened the inclusion of financial 
experts in sections 406 and 407 of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 to include investment bankers and venture 
capitalists.   
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Why has fraud continued to occur even though boards are now more independent than 
the situation prior to the Asian financial crisis? The company law in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
like the US and the UK, imposes duties and liabilities on directors, including independent 
directors, for failure of oversight.59 Similar to the US and the UK, there are also liabilities in 
connection with  market misconduct under the securities laws of Hong Kong and Singapore.60 
However, despite the “law in the books”, we are interested in the “law in action”. We argue 
that making the boards more independent is not, in itself, sufficient, if it is not accompanied by 
the appropriate consequences if the directors fall short of their duty of care or oversight.61 In 
the US, independent directors of publicly listed companies face a high likelihood of private 
enforcement actions under corporate and securities laws due to an active plaintiffs’ attorneys 
bar. Shareholder litigation is very common in the US. 62  However, notwithstanding the 
frequency of shareholder litigation, independent directors are exposed to very little personal, 
out of pocket, liability risks in civil trials for failing to discharge their duties if the directors are 
properly covered by a directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance, unless civil proceedings are 
brought by government regulators to send a deterrent message.63 The main threat to these 
independent directors are aggravation, loss of time and reputational harm in these lawsuits. In 
the UK, shareholder litigation (and more particularly, shareholder suits against independent 
directors) are rare. Armour et al have found that the independent directors face little threat of 
                                                          
59  See WY Wan et al, “Public and Private Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Laws in Hong Kong 
and Singapore’, copy on file.  
60  Ibid.  
61  See J C Coffee, Jr., “Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement” (2007) 156 U Pa L Rev. 229; H 
E Jackson & M J Roe, “Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence” (2009) 
93 J Fin Econ 207; La Porta et al., “What Works in Securities Laws?” (2006) 61 J Fin 1; John Armour et al., 
“Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United 
States” (2009) 6 J Empirical Legal Stud 687. 
62  BR Cheffins and BS Black, ‘Outside Director Liability Across Countries’ (2006) 84 Texas Law 
Review 1385. 
63  BS Black, BR Cheffins, and M Klausner, ‘Outside Director Liability’ (2010) 58(4) Stanford Law 
Review 1055. 
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civil liability and disqualification orders are hardly made against independent directors of UK 
publicly listed companies.64  
However, in contrast to the US and the UK where the shareholdings of the public 
companies are largely dispersed, the greatest threat to minority shareholders in controlled 
companies, which are the norm in Hong Kong and Singapore, is the expropriation of benefits 
by controlling shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders. It remains an empirical 
question as to the experiences of the US and the UK apply to both jurisdictions; in particular, 
in respect of whether and how often independent directors are called to account when they fail 
to discharge their duties of oversight when fraud takes place. While there are single-jurisdiction 
empirical studies on the enforcement framework of corporate and securities laws in Hong Kong 
and Singapore, they do not specifically target how often independent directors are in fact sued 
or held to account.65 Our findings will be relevant to the question of whether the independent 
directors are sufficiently incentivised to discharge their duties properly.  
 
2.3 The challenges and opportunities of foreign listings 
                                                          
64  J Armour, BS Black, BR Cheffins, and R Nolan, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An 
Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States’ (2009) 6(4) Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 687, 716; only one outside director of a publicly listed company was the subject of disqualification 
proceedings over 2004-2006 period.  
65  For studies in Hong Kong, see D Donald and P Cheuk, ‘ Hong Kong’s Public Enforcement 
Model of Investor Protection’, (2017) 4 Asian Journal of Law and Society 34; See also D Donald, A 
Financial Centre for Two Empires (2013, CUP), ch 3; Mezanotte FE (2017) The unconvincing rise of the 
statutory derivative action in Hong Kong: evidence from its first 10 years of enforcement. JCLS 17:469-496. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2017.1285548. Accessed 26 October 2017. 
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In Hong Kong and Singapore, 66 as compared with the major exchanges in the US and 
the UK,67 a high proportion of the companies is incorporated outside of the jurisdiction of 
listing. Further, as outlined above, irrespective of their place of incorporation, a high proportion 
of these companies are foreign listings. As the assets and operations of the company are outside 
the reach of the country of listing, scholars have pointed out the significant regulatory risks that 
arise in Hong Kong and Singapore, which are not present in the same scale elsewhere.68 Civil 
enforcement of judgments against these companies or its management for breaches of the 
listing country’s laws or regulation is challenging because its assets and businesses and/or 
management are predominantly located outside such country. Public enforcement may also be 
less forthcoming; in the US context, it has been argued that the securities regulator in the listing 
jurisdiction may be more hesitant to enforce its laws against cross-listed firms.69  
In our study, we examine the ways in which the regulatory framework has evolved to take 
into account the risks of foreign listings. Drawing reference to the specific case studies within 
the sample, we analyse the barriers that the boards have in taking control of overseas 
subsidiaries after fraud has been discovered and the difficulties the regulators have in bringing 
enforcement proceedings against the errant directors.   
2.4 Contribution 
Finally, we explain how our study contributes to the existing literature relating to managing 
the risks of corporate fraud among publicly listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
                                                          
66  The statistics from World Federation of Exchanges, as at December 2015, shows that 37% of the 
companies listed on SGX are foreign companies. In respect of Hong Kong, as at March 2017, only 15% of the 
companies listed on SEHK are incorporated under Hong Kong law. Source: CapitalIQ.  (See also D Donald, A 
Financial Centre for Two Empires (2013, CUP), ch 3). We have not used the statistics from World Federation 
of Exchanges for Hong Kong as it classifies China-incorporated companies as “domestic”.  
67  In comparison, on New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, 21.9% and 13.6% of the companies are 
foreign companies respectively, as at December 2015. On the London Stock Exchange, 19.1% of the companies 
are foreign companies. The statistics are obtained from World Federation of Exchanges.  
68  See D Donald, n 66. 
69  E.g. J Siegel, ‘Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting US Securities Laws?’ 
(2005)75 Journal of Financial Economics 319. 
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First, Donald’s Hong Kong has examined how corporate and securities law in Hong Kong 
addresses the specific risks found in the market, and discusses the key enforcement actions 
taken against fraudulent firms and their directors or officers for the period 2006 to 2012.70 Our 
study is different; we present a new dataset which compares the corporate governance 
characteristics of the boards among the fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms. In this way, we 
can have a more targeted approach in our responses on the appropriate regulatory framework 
to prevent future fraud cases. Second, Donald and Cheuk examined the public enforcement 
strategies of Hong Kong regulators using the aggregate data of enforcement actions against, 
among others, the listed companies and their directors and officers.71 Our dataset focuses 
specifically on regulatory strategies against independent directors, in determining whether 
these directors are sufficiently held accountable for their failure of oversight that usually occurs 
in fraud cases.   
3. Regulatory Reforms in Hong Kong and Singapore Post Asian Financial Crisis and 
Global Financial Crisis 
3.1  Governance reforms since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 
In this section, we explain the reasons for the transplantation of independent directors 
into Hong Kong and Singapore. The origins lie in the Asian financial crisis of 1997; since the 
crisis, financial markets in Asia have adopted and refined, to varying extents, Anglo-American 
corporate and securities regulatory frameworks, which are regarded as the paradigm of 
internationally recognised good practices in corporate governance. Such adoption was also 
supported by ‘law matters’ research which suggested that the legal framework governing 
financial markets and corporate governance had an important role to play in creating the 
                                                          
70  See D Donald, n 66, chs 2, 3 and 5. 
71  D Donald and P Cheuk, ‘ Hong Kong’s Public Enforcement Model of Investor Protection’, (2017) 4 
Asian Journal of Law and Society 349. 
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conditions for strong capital markets.72 The rationale is that investment is encouraged by good 
legal institutions reducing the risk of investor expropriation. 73  English origin countries 
(including the US and the UK) are said to have laws that better protect investors than civil law 
countries. While the link between law and financial development is one of cause or effect has 
been hotly debated in later studies,74 the hypothesis has not been decisively rejected. However, 
the endorsement of the La Porta study in the World Bank’s first report on Doing Business75 
influenced many jurisdictions (including Singapore and Hong Kong) to adopt and strengthen 
various concepts of the common law countries, and in particular the Anglo-American model.  
In Singapore, the best practice of one-third rule of independent directors was introduced 
via Code of Corporate Governance 2001 (Singapore Code). The proportion of companies with 
at least one-third independent directors on boards of Singapore listed firms increased from 80% 
in 2001 to at least 97% in 2010, even though the Singapore Code operates only on a ‘comply 
or explain’ basis.76 In Hong Kong, the SEHK listing rules in 1993 required a minimum of two 
independent non-executive directors (INEDs); the Hong Kong Code of Corporate Governance 
2004 later recommended one third of the board to be independent. In 2004, the listing rules 
were amended to require a minimum of three INEDs on the board, and at least one INED 
possessing appropriate professional qualifications or accounting or related financial 
                                                          
72  R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer , and RW Vishny ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) Journal 
of Political Economy 1113; R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, and A Shleifer ‘The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins’ (2008) 46(2) Journal of Economic Literature 285. 
73  R La Porta et al, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113. See also R La Porta et al, ‘Legal 
Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 JFin 1131. 
74  See eg JC Coffee, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation 
of Ownership and Control’ (2001) 111 Yale LJ 1 (arguing that legal developments have tended to follow, rather 
than precede, economic change). 
75  World Bank, ‘Doing Business in 2004; Understanding Regulation’ (World Bank, 2 January 2003) < 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB04-
FullReport.pdf> accessed 1 July 2017. 
76  Singapore Institute of Directors, ‘Singapore Board of Directors Survey’ (2001); (2010); Mak Yuen 
Teen, ‘Improving the Implementation of Corporate Governance Practices in Singapore’ (MAS, 26 June 2007) < 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/news_room/press_releases/2007/CG_Study%20_Executive_Summary
_260607.pdf> accessed 1 July 2017. 
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management expertise.77 In 2012, these requirements were further raised to one-third of the 
board with a minimum of three directors.78 Likewise, as in the case of Singapore, there is high 
compliance of the one-third rule requirement (an increase from 84% in 2006 to 100% in 2012) 
even before the one-third requirement became mandatory.79 
However, listed firms in Hong Kong and Singapore have not been as enthusiastic in 
complying with the “comply or explain” requirement to separate of the roles of the Chairman 
and CEO.80 In Hong Kong, as at 2012, 67.4% of the Mainboard-listed companies have separate 
roles for the Chairman and CEO.81 This is not very different from the position in Singapore 
where, as at 2016, 71.6% of the SGX-listed companies maintain the separation.82  
The Cadbury Report was also influential in the developments relating to audit 
committees and monitoring expertise of independent directors in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
While Singapore’s requirement of audit committees has been present since 1989 (prior to the 
publication of the Cadbury Report), the legislation then only requires a majority of the 
committee to comprise non-executive directors. The Cadbury Report recommends the audit 
committee to have at least three members, comprising non-executive directors with a majority 
who are independent. The Singapore Code requires the audit committee to be made up of at 
least three members of non-executive directors, with a majority, including its chairman, to be 
independent of management. In addition, the Singapore Code provides for at least two members 
                                                          
77  SEHK listing rules, rule 3.10.  
78  As from 2013, the SEHK listing rules (which are mandatory) now require at least one third of the board 
to be independent: rule 3.10A. 
79  SEHK, ‘Analysis of Corporate Governance Practices Disclosure in 2006 Annual Reports’ (SEHK, 
February 2008) < http://www.hkexnews.hk/reports/corpgovpract/Documents/CG%20report.pdf> accessed 1 
July 2017; SEHK, ‘Analysis of Corporate Governance Practice Disclosure in 2012 Annual Reports’, (SEHK, 
November 2013) < http://www.hkexnews.hk/reports/corpgovpract/Documents/CG_Practices_2012_e.pdf> 
accessed 1 July 2017. 
80  Code of Corporate Governance, Principle A.2.1 (Hong Kong); Code of Corporate Governance, 
Guideline 3.1 (Singapore) 
81  CFA Institute, How Independent are Boards in Hong Kong Mainboard Companies (2012). 
82  Singapore Institute of Directors, The Singapore Directorship Report 2016 
http://www.sid.org.sg/Web/Resources/Singapore_Directorship_Report_2016.aspx accessed 31 October 2017. 
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of the audit committee to possess accounting or related financial management expertise or 
experience.83 As mentioned above, the Singapore Code operates on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
In Hong Kong, the listing rules (which are mandatory), since 2005, provide that every listed 
issuer must establish an audit committee comprising non-executive directors only, with a 
minimum of three members, and at least one is an INED with appropriate professional 
qualifications or accounting related financial management. The majority of the audit committee 
must be INEDs and its chairman must be an INED.84  
While Hong Kong and Singapore have concentrated ownership structures among their 
listed firms which are very different from the dispersed shareholding structure in the US/UK, 
independent directors are seen as protection of minority shareholder interests in dealing with 
the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Thus, audit committees, 
which comprise a majority of independent directors, are tasked to oversee the firms’ financial 
reporting process and internal controls.85 In Hong Kong and Singapore, INEDs and audit 
committees are respectively tasked with reviewing related party transactions (including 
interested person transactions and connected transactions) entered into by the issuers. In cases 
where shareholders’ approval are required, they take into account the recommendation of the 
advice from the independent financial adviser.86 For continuing transactions, in addition to 
                                                          
83  Corporate Governance Committee, ‘Report of the Committee and Code of Corporate Governance’ 
(MAS, 21 March 2001) 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Regulations%20and%20Financial%20Stability/Regulatory%20and%20
Supervisory%20Framework/Corporate%20Governance%20of%20Listed%20Companies/corfinalrpt.pdf> 
accessed 1 July 2017. 
84  SEHK listing rules, rule 3.21. 
85  The Work Group, ‘Guidebook for Audit Committees in Singapore (second edition)’ (MAS, 19 August 
2014) 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Regulations%20and%20Financial%20Stability/Regulatory%20and%20
Supervisory%20Framework/Corporate%20Governance%20of%20Listed%20Companies/Guidebook%20for%20
ACs%202nd%20edition.pdf> accessed 1 July 2017. 
86  SEHK listing rules, rule 14A.39; SGX listing rules, rule 917.  
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reporting by the auditors, the INEDs review the transactions yearly and confirm, among other 
things, that the transactions are entered into in the ordinary course of business.87  
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether independent directors can function effectively 
in controlled firms. First, independent directors are ultimately appointed by controlling 
shareholders and it is questionable as to the extent to which independent directors can 
effectively monitor the management, who are selected by the controlling shareholders, or even 
the controlling shareholders who perpetuate the fraud.88  Second, information asymmetries 
between the independent directors and the controlling shareholders continue to persist since 
the independent directors will also be dependent on the information from the key corporate 
officers. Although legal reforms influenced by the developments in the UK and the US have 
taken place by the mid-2000s, the wave of the fraud incidents post-financial crisis of 2007/2008 
raises the question of the effectiveness of these reforms.  
 
3.2 Post-Financial Crisis 
The wave of corporate fraud in Hong Kong and Singapore that came to light in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 raises the question of the effectiveness of the 
post-Asian financial crisis of 1997 reforms relating to the promotion of independent directors 
and audit committees. In particular, there is considerable emphasis on the governance failures 
of the S-Chips and the P-Chips.  
By way of background, in the 2000s, as a result of the expansion of the Chinese 
economy, many businesses in China were in need of capital. Due to the restrictions in the 
                                                          
87  SEHK listing rules, rule 14A.55. 
88  Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (3rd edn, 
OUP 2017) 65. 
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raising of capital in the domestic markets, there was a flood of Chinese businesses who sought 
to list in Hong Kong, Singapore and the US.  However, with the onset of the financial crisis 
and the fraud and accounting scandals that have taken place, these overseas listed Chinese firms 
have generally performed poorly as compared with their industry peers.89 Unlike many of the 
US-listed Chinese firms that are mired in accounting scandals which are listed via reverse 
mergers (that purportedly provide less scrutiny),90 most of the P-Chips and S-Chips were listed 
in their respective exchanges via initial public offerings (IPOs).91  
 
3.2.1 What happened in Singapore? 
When the S-Chips were first introduced to the Singapore market, investors had a keen 
interest because of the perception of riding on the economic growth of China. Many of these 
companies were middle tier companies that were unable to obtain the capital to finance their 
growth in mainland China.92 The SGX also warmly welcomed these firms. While the S-Chips 
were almost unheard of in 2000, they constitute 21.6% of all of the listed companies in absolute 
numbers by 2010. 93  The financial crisis of 2007/2008 exposed the corporate governance 
weaknesses of many firms and reputation of the S-Chips were particularly hit. For example, in 
2009, money in bank accounts were found to be missing in Sun Bio-Chem Technology.94 The 
CEO and his wife disappeared in China Printing and Dyeing.95 Oriental Century had falsified 
                                                          
89  Y Luo, F Fang, and OA Esqueda, ‘The overseas listing puzzle: Post-IPO performance of Chinese 
stocks and ADRs in the U.S. market’ (2012) 22(5) Journal of Multinational Financial Management 193. 
90  JS Ang et al n 14. 
91  In Singapore and Hong Kong, the enlarged group of assets in the reverse merger must meet the criteria 
for listing, and hence there are limited ways of which the issuers can circumvent the listing criteria via reverse 
mergers (see SGX listing rules, rule 1015). See SEHK Main Board listing rules, rule 8.05 read with rule 14.54. 
92   SY Leu, ‘Corporate: The Next Chapter for S-Chips’ The Edge (Hong Kong, 14 November 2011). 
93  See n 4.  
94  EY Goh, ‘Tougher action needed on errant S-Chips’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 1 June 2009) 
95  X Chew, ‘Risks and S-Chips on SGX’s mind’ Business Times (Singapore, 4 April 2009). 
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accounts over a number of years.96 The fortunes of these companies are also closely tied to that 
of their controlling shareholders. Many of these controlling shareholders also took out personal 
loans, charged over their shares, and these loans were not disclosed to the market.97 When they 
failed to pay their loans and their creditors enforced the security, this triggered off the change 
of control provisions in the loan agreements or covenants.98  
By 2009, 27% of the S-Chips were under inquiries from regulators or had suspicions of 
fraud raised by their auditors.99 By 2011, 10% of the S-Chips were suspended from trading due 
to governance or accounting issues.100 However, it should be emphasised that fraud was not 
confined only to the S-Chips but included other companies.101   
 
3.2.2 What happened in Hong Kong? 
In Hong Kong, one of the most significant developments in its capital markets has been 
the influx of listings from companies in China.102 In the 1990s, Chinese state-owned enterprises 
listed their H-share companies. Red-chip companies, which are companies controlled by 
mainland Chinese government entities but incorporated overseas, followed suit. 103 At the same 
time, many private enterprises whose operations are in China but were incorporated in 
                                                          
96  XY Cheow, ‘Oriental Century Makes CAD  Report’ Today (Singapore, 30 June 2009); L Khoo, 
‘Oriental Century appoints legal advisor, special accountant’ Business Times (Singapore, 14 March 2009) 
97 J Lee, ‘SGX may force lifting of veil on pledged shares’ Business Times (Singapore, 24 August 2009). 
98  For example, the cases involving Guanzhao Industrial Forest Biotechnology Group and China Sky 
Chemical Fibre Co Ltd. See also discussion in ZH Peh, ‘Dealing with Perception: a Look at Overseas-Listed 
Chinese Firms in Singapore’ (Centre for Banking and Finance Law, 6 February 2014) 
<https://law.nus.edu.sg/cbfl/pdfs/working_papers/Peh%20Zu%20Hao%20Working%20PaperV2.pdf.> accessed 
1 July 2017. 
99  XY Cheow and K Chow, ‘S-chips under the spotlight’, Today (19 May 2009).  
100  J Kwok, ‘Are S-chips still a possible play?’, The Straits Times (Singapore, 25 December 2011)  
101  E.g. Daka Design (incorporated in Bermuda but whose assets are not primarily located in China but in 
Hong Kong) was found to have falsified its accounts. Michelle Quah, ‘Two Former Daka Directors Jailed as 
SGX Effort Pays Off’ The Business Times (Singapore, 20 October 2011).  
102  See generally, GYM Chan, ‘Understanding the enforcement strategy for regulating the listing market of 
Hong Kong’ (2014) 14(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79. 
103  A list of red-chips can be found at https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/smstat/chidimen/cd_rcmb.htm 
accessed 1 July 2017.  
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Bermuda, British Virgin Islands or the Cayman Islands were listed on SEHK. The reasons 
appear, among other things, to be based on tax benefits and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) restrictions on the number of Chinese-incorporated companies that are permitted to list 
domestically.104  As at 2014, all of mainland enterprises constitute 50% of the listed companies 
in Hong Kong and 60% of the market capitalisation. 105  The mainland Chinese private 
enterprises or P-Chips constitutes approximately 34.9% of the listed firms on SEHK and 16.6% 
of the market capitalisation.106 Hong Kong was a natural listing destination in view of its 
proximity to China and its developed capital markets as well as the bonding effect which result 
in receiving a larger premium because listing overseas signals the commitment of the listed 
firm to adhere to more stringent corporate governance regime. 107  In this paper, we are 
concerned with the corporate governance characteristics of overseas mainland Chinese listed 
firms, which have dominated the financial press.   
Beginning from 2007, a series of high profile fraud cases hit the market. Three 
examples are given, which are in our dataset.108 In 2009, Gome Electrical Appliances, the 
largest consumer electronics retailer in China, was embroiled in a scandal where the SFC 
brought proceedings against its chairman and his wife (both of whom are directors) for using 
                                                          
104  D Donald, A Financial Centre for Two Empires: Hong Kong's Corporate, Securities and Tax Laws in 
its Transition from Britain to China (Cambridge University Press 2013) 57-58. 
105  HKEX, ‘Market Statistics 2014’ (HKEX, 8 January 2015) < 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2015/Documents/150108news.pdf> accessed 1 July 2017 
106   Ibid. 
107  JC Coffee, ‘Racing towards the top? The impact of cross-listings and stock-market competition on 
international corporate governance’ (2002) 102(7) Columbia Law Review 1757 (introducing bonding effect); 
see FH Kung and CL Cheng, ‘The determinants of overseas listing decisions: Evidence from Chinese H-share 
companies’ 11(5) Asian Business & Management 591.   
108 We have not included the 2008 investigations involving the false and misleading information issued by 
CITIC Pacific’s (now known as CITIC) in its financial position arising from the massive losses incurred by 
CITIC over its investment in leveraged foreign exchange contracts. See SFC, ‘Investigation commenced on 
Citic Pacific Limited’ (SFC, 22 October 2008) <https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=08PR166> accessed 1 July 2017. SFC commenced proceedings against CITC 
and its executive directors to recover compensation in 2014: SFC, ‘SFC commences proceedings against CITIC, 
its former chairman and executive directors’ (SFC, 11 September 2014) 
<https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=14PR108> 
accessed 1 July 2017. The reason for the exclusion is that the Market Misconduct Tribunal eventually 
exonerated the company and its directors. See SFC, ‘Market Misconduct Tribunal finds no market misconduct 
in CITIC’s publication of a circular’ (SFC, 10 April 2017). 
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company’s funds to effect a share buyback of their shares in order to repay personal loans to 
financial institutions.109 In 2011, the shares of China Forestry Holdings (and several other 
companies) were suspended after auditors found possible irregularities during the audit.110 In 
2013, the SFC commenced proceedings to wind up China Metal Recycling on the grounds that 
the company was involved in an elaborate scheme to inflate its performance, revenue and 
profits, even since the days of its IPO.111 In 2017, the SFC reported that complaints to the SFC 
had doubled since 2011 and produced a 50% increase in the launching of formal proceedings.112 
 
4. Corporate Governance Characteristics Among Fraudulent and Non-Fraudulent 
Companies: Similarities and Differences  
4.1 Sample and Data  
We first assemble a dataset of fraudulent SEHK and SGX-listed companies, where 
investigations for fraud have commenced for the period 2007-2014. Our sources of information 
on whether fraud is committed is from the enforcement actions taken by the Commercial 
Affairs Department (CAD), 113  Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC),114 SEHK and SGX which are publicly disclosed, news articles 
                                                          
109  SFC, ‘Court Grants Injunction to Freeze Assets of Ex-Gome Chairman and Wife’ (SFC, 7 August 
2009) < http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=09PR109> accessed 1 July 2017. In 2014, compensation was ordered to be 
paid by the chairman and his wife to the company: SFC, ‘SFC obtains $420 million compensation for GOME 
over breaches of directors’ duties by former chairman and wife in share repurchase’ (SFC, 11 March 2014) < 
SFC obtains $420 million compensation for GOME over breaches of directors’ duties by former chairman and 
wife in share repurchase’> accessed 1 July 2017. 
110  China Forestry Holdings, ‘Suspension of Trading’ 31 January 2011 (copy on file with authors); South 
China Morning Post Publishers, ‘IPO investors need better protection’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, 
6 April 2012). 
111  SFC, ‘SFC obtains court order to wind up China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Limited’ (SFC, 26 
February 2015) < https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=15PR18> accessed 1 July 2017. 
112  D Weinland and J Hughes, ‘Complaints about listed companies jump in Hong Kong’ Financial Times 
(Hong Kong, 8 November 2016). 
113  Commercial Affairs Department is the principal law enforcement agency for the investigation of white-
collar crime in Singapore, including market misconduct.  
114  Monetary Authority of Singapore and Securities and Futures Commission investigate breaches of the 
SFA and SFO respectively and are able to institute administrative proceedings against persons who have 
infringed the market misconduct provisions in the securities legislation of Singapore and Hong Kong 
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from major financial presses and announcements from the firms (such as where special audits 
are commissioned). Public and private enforcement actions are also supplemented by judicial 
decisions reported on Lawnet in Singapore and LexisNexis in Hong Kong. We also include 
cases where the companies were under investigation for fraud and while these investigations 
had not concluded as at 30 June 2017, the companies have been compulsorily delisted or were 
directed by the stock exchange to enter into prolonged suspension.  
Enforcement actions in respect of fraud are found from the enforcement reporters of 
SGX, SEHK, SFC, MAS and CAD and their respective annual reports. However, as not all of 
the criminal prosecutions in Singapore are found in the annual reports of CAD, they are 
assembled on the basis of searches on Lawnet. We only include cases involving fraud as 
defined above, and we exclude insider dealing or market manipulation as they do not result in 
improper diversions of corporate funds or property that expropriate shareholders. We also 
exclude the discipline of persons licensed to perform brokerage, investment and advisory 
services.  
Additionally, we supplement the information in respect of the companies found to be 
fraudulent from the major news releases by searching all of the major business new journals 
on Factiva. Corporate governance information relating to the board compositions and 
shareholdings is obtained from the corporate annual reports, the companies’ websites and/or 
Bloomberg. Financial information is obtained from SDC Platinum.  
Under our definition of fraud, we identify a sample of 97 firms listed on SEHK and 
SGX which have, or whose top management have, been discovered to be fraudulent during the 
sample period. We exclude 35 firms for which the annual reports or financial information is 
                                                          
respectively. See Monetary Authority of Singapore, Capital Markets Enforcement (2016) < 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Monographs-and-Information-Papers/2016/Capital-Markets-
Enforcement-monograph.aspx> accessed 1 July 2017. For the role of the Securities and Futures Commission, 
see http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/about-the-sfc/our-role/, accessed 1 July 2017.  
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not available from SDC Platinum, a paid subscription database, or from the companies’ 
websites (as we would not be able to do the matching) or companies which we could not find 
matches (as explained below). Our final sample consists of 62 firms, comprising 37 SEHK- 
and 25 SGX-listed firms. 41 out of the 62 (66.13%) of the fraudulent firms are overseas 
mainland Chinese listed firms.115 Further, a significant proportion of the fraudulent firms in 
Hong Kong and Singapore (100% and 44% respectively) are foreign-incorporated companies.  
Adapting Beasley et al116  and Dechow,117  we identify a control group of 62 non-
fraudulent firms. Each fraudulent firm was matched with the non-fraudulent firm based on the 
following requirements:  
(1) stock exchange, that is, the shares of the fraudulent firm and its matched non-fraudulent 
firm trade on the same national stock exchange (SGX or SEHK); 
(2) industry; the non-fraudulent firm has the same two-digit SIC code as the fraudulent 
firm;  
(3) listing year; the non-fraudulent firm has a similar listing age (within one year) as the 
fraudulent firm; and 
(4) asset size; within the categories (1), (2) and (3), the non-fraudulent firm is chosen as 
the one which is the closest in asset size to the fraudulent firm, as measured in the year 
immediately preceding the fraud.  
 
                                                          
115  There is no definition of overseas mainland Chinese listed firms in the listing rules of SEHK or SGX. 
Adapting from the MSCI Overseas China Index 2011, we regard a firm as an overseas Chinese listed firm if 
more than 50% of its assets in China and the company derives 80% of its revenue in China, irrespective of 
where it is incorporated. Thus, in the context of Hong Kong, such firms will comprise the H shares companies, 
red chips and mainland private enterprises (formerly known as non-H share mainland private enterprises). 
116  Beasley, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and 
Financial Statement Fraud’, n 15 above. 
117  PM Dechow, RG Sloan, and AP Sweeney, n 42 above. 
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We then hand collect the required information on corporate governance characteristics 
from the annual reports, including the data on board characteristics (size of the board, number 
of independent directors, number of directors on the audit committees, whether the CEO is the 
chairman, whether the CEO, chairman or founder is also the controlling shareholder of the 
firm).  
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 summarises the variables used in our comparison. Board Size refers to the 
number of directors on the board of directors of the company. CEO_Large, Chair_Large and 
Founder_Large refer to whether the largest shareholder is the CEO, Chairman or founder 
respectively. Duality is whether the company combines the roles of the Chairman and CEO. 
INED is proportion of independent directors to board, AC_INED is the proportion of 
independent directors in audit committee, and AC_FINA refers to the proportion of audit 
committees with non-accounting finance expertise. Total asset and ROA refers to the total 
assets and net income divided by total assets, in each case as at the end of the financial year 
where the fraud first took place. The mean of the board size is 7.49. Regarding the board 
composition, on average, 41.94% of the firms have CEO/chairman duality. The largest 
shareholder is the CEO in, on average, 47.58% of the firms. In comparison, the largest 
shareholder is the chairman of the board in 60.48% of the firms and is the founder in 53.23% 
of the firms. The mean proportion of independent directors on the boards is 43.31%. For the 
audit committee, the mean proportion of independent directors is 92.83% and the mean 
proportion of audit committees with finance expertise is 29.22%. Finally, for the firm 
characteristics, the mean size (as measured by total asset) of the firms is USD 210.319 million, 
and the mean ROA is 29.01%.  
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Table 2 summaries the breakdown on the number of fraudulent cases by type of 
violation.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4.2 Results 
 We start by comparing the differences in board composition characteristics between the 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms, to investigate whether there are significant differences 
between the two groups. Specifically, we test whether the board size, whether the largest 
shareholder is the CEO, Chairman or founder, CEO/Chairman Duality, proportion of 
independent directors to board, proportion of independent directors in audit committee, and 
proportion of audit committees with non-accounting finance expertise are different between 
the two groups.  
 The results are reported in Table 3. Column (1) and (2) reports the statistics for non-
fraudulent firms (control group) and fraudulent firms (treatment group) respectively. Column 
(3) summarises the difference between the two groups, while Column (4) reports the p-values 
for the differences. 
Table 3 Differences in board composition characteristics between Fraudulent 
and Non-fraudulent firms 
[Insert Table 3] 
The pooled data fraudulent firms in Singapore and Hong Kong are shown to have higher 
propensity of CEO/chairman duality: the difference is 16.13% which is statistically significant 
at 10% level (p=0.06). We find no difference in whether the CEO is, in each case, also largest 
shareholder, chairman or founder of the firm between the two groups. When it comes to the 
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board size or the proportion of independent directors, we do not find any significant differences 
between the two groups.  
 
 The fact that the proportion of independent directors on the boards of the two groups of 
companies do not differ is not surprising given that there is a high degree of compliance of the 
requirement that one-third of the board comprises independent directors in both jurisdictions.118  
However, in relation to the requirement to separate the roles of the CEO/Chairman, where 
compliance has been less enthusiastic,119 the pooled data fraudulent firms in Singapore and 
Hong Kong are shown to have higher propensity of CEO/chairman duality. We find no 
difference in whether the CEO is, in each case, also largest shareholder, chairman or founder 
of the firm between the two groups.  
For the audit committee, we again cannot find a significant difference in the proportion 
of independent directors on the audit committees. As summarised, most audit committee 
members are independent: 93.48% (93.01%) of the audit committee are independent directors 
for the non-fraudulent (fraudulent) firms.  However, we find the fraudulent firms have a lower 
proportion of audit committees with non-accounting finance expertise. The difference is 9.78%, 
which is statistically significant at 5% level. When we compare the fraudulent companies 
which are the subject of disclosure failures against all the other companies in our sample, we 
find that disclosure-fraud companies have a lower mean of audit committee members with non-
accounting finance expertise (0.69) than other firms (1.00) and the difference is significant 
(p=0.02). Our results suggest that non-accounting financial expertise is valuable and can 
improve the effectiveness of the audit committees in monitoring (and preventing) disclosure-
based fraud. 
                                                          
118118  See nn 76-78 and accompanying text. 
119  See n 80 and accompanying text. 
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4.3 Foreign listings 
Finally, on whether foreign listings are more likely to commit fraud, we have used two 
reference points. We test whether there is a difference between foreign and locally-incorporated 
companies, and whether there is a difference between the overseas mainland Chinese listed 
firms and the non-overseas mainland Chinese listed firms. We have the data for all of the 62 
firms in our sample. 
In our unreported results using chi-squared test, we do not find a significant difference 
between foreign and locally-incorporated companies in respect of whether the former are more 
likely to commit fraud, whether pooled together or analysing each jurisdiction separately. 
However, using chi-squared and/or Fisher’s exact test, we find that there is significant 
difference between overseas mainland Chinese listed firms and non-overseas mainland Chinese 
listed firms in the propensity to commit fraud (significant at 1% level), whether pooled together 
or analysing Hong Kong and Singapore separately. This would suggest that firms with 
significant overseas principal subsidiaries and/or assets in the mainland China are significantly 
associated with fraud in the two markets. The reasons are set out in Section 5 below.  
5 Lessons and Implications of Our Findings on Board Characteristics and Foreign 
Listings 
In the preceding sections, we find that the characteristics between the fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent firms do not differ significantly, except in three areas: the chairman/CEO 
duality, the presence of non-accounting financial expertise, and the dominance of foreign 
listings. In particular, since the Asian financial crisis, the independent directors are put in place 
to serve as a check on the controlling shareholders. All of the companies in the fraudulent 
sample had independent board representation on the boards. In fact, the proportion of 
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independent directors on the boards or audit committees between the two groups does not differ 
significantly. However, if the independent directors are effective, one would have expected 
that the scandals would not have occurred. Yet, why did the corporate governance not work as 
well in those fraudulent cases? In this Section 5, we argue that the fraudulent cases have 
continued to occur due to the following factors. First, particularly in controlled companies, 
independent directors do not necessarily have access to information in order to effectively 
monitor related party transactions or other kinds of conflicted transactions. Second, foreign 
listings continue to present challenges of regulation that are not present in the same scale as 
domestic listings.  We further suggest possible reforms.    
5.1 Concentration of power, related party transactions and expertise 
The dominance of companies with concentrated shareholdings raise significant 
concerns to minority shareholders because of the ability of the controlling shareholders to 
tunnel benefits in the form of RPTs or other conflicted transactions between themselves and 
the listed companies.120 The concerns are magnified if the board is dominated by a single 
individual, in particular, the person who is also the chairman and CEO or where the person is 
also the founder or the largest shareholder, and the transactions entered into by the company 
are with such person. We have evidence that fraudulent firms are more likely to have 
CEO/Chairman duality. Further in our sample of 62 firms, 50 (or 80.6%) of the firms have one 
or more of the risk factors: the largest shareholder is also the CEO, Chairman or founder and 
CEO/chairman. Thus, while the fact that CEO is also the chairman, or the largest shareholder 
is the CEO, Chairman or founder, is potentially innocuous and present in well-run firms but 
once the transactions are entered into such person, the concerns intensify. In Hong Kong and 
Singapore, RPTs among listed firms are very significant.121 When we measure the level of 
                                                          
120  See literature cited in Chen et al, n 23. 
121  Chen et al, n 23. 
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RPTs that the fraudulent companies have entered into in the three years prior to the fraud, in 
unreported results, we find that fraudulent firms, on average, have higher RPT sales (defined 
as sales to related parties relative to revenue) and RPT income (defined as income derived from 
related parties relative to revenue) than the treatment firms (significant at 5%).  
Both Hong Kong and Singapore rely on, among others, independent directors to 
regulate related party transactions (RPTs) and other conflicted transactions.122 Independent 
shareholders are also required to approve the transactions when they cross a numerical 
threshold. However, almost half (45.2%) of the fraudulent cases in the sample involve either 
misappropriation of assets or problematic RPTs which were not disclosed to the boards and/or 
shareholders nor properly approved by the boards and/or shareholders. As Table 2 shows, 30.65% 
of the fraud cases relate to misappropriation of assets or cash, which by definition were kept 
away from the boards.  
We argue that the effectiveness of independent directors in controlled firms in 
monitoring these transactions will depend on whether they have full access to information and 
having the requisite monitoring expertise. In companies with concentrated shareholdings, the 
management, whose appointments are ultimately dependent on the boards which are appointed 
by controlling shareholders, may not come forth with full disclosure on RPTs or other 
conflicted transactions.123 The only sources of independent information are from the internal 
or external auditors,124 which usually only the directors serving on the audit committee will 
                                                          
122   In larger transactions, the transactions require, additionally, the opinion of the independent financial 
advisers and the approval of the independent shareholders. See Chen et al, n 23. 
123  Eg GOME Electrical Appliance Holdings (Hong Kong) (the director caused the company to repurchase 
shares held by him and connected entities without proper disclosure to the board as to his interests; in particular, 
the non-executive directors were not notified). See SFC, ‘SFC obtains $420 million compensation for GOME 
over breaches of directors’ duties by former executive chairman and wife in share repurchase’ (11 March 2014). 
In Minth, the company entered into a transaction with the third party who was connected with the chairman, 
who was also the largest shareholder and founder, and did not disclose to the non-executive directors. See SFC, 
‘SFC seeks court orders against chairman, current and former directors of Minth Group Limited’ 15 April 2014. 
124  Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2012, Guideline 12.5; Hong Kong Corporate Governance 
Code, Principle A.7. 
 37 
 
 
have access. While the listing rules do provide for (and in certain cases, mandate) the 
appointment of independent advisers to advise the independent directors on the fairness of the 
transactions,125 they continue to depend on the management bringing these transactions to the 
boards (and for the boards to seek advice). In enforcement proceedings relating to RPTs, many 
of the cases relate to the failure of the boards to seek independent advice, even when required 
to do so.126   
 
Independent directors can appoint external advisers and/or special auditors to assist 
them when they suspect wrongdoing by management127 but such appointments can be a costly 
exercise and are often seen as unfriendly or even hostile. For example, in the case of Sino-
Environment Technology Group, when the independent directors engaged professional 
advisers and auditors as part of a special audit to investigate the transactions entered into by 
the company, with the latter costing at least S$$950,000,128 the move was criticised by the 
executive directors.129  
On the question of expertise, policy makers may wish to consider whether it is helpful 
to encourage non-accounting financial expertise on the audit committees of the companies, 
given the significance that audit committees serve in monitoring RPTs or other conflicted 
transactions. Such experts have direct experience with analysis of financial statements and are 
                                                          
125  SEHK listing rules, chapter 14A (connected party transactions); SGX listing rules, chapter 9 (interested 
person transactions). 
126  E.g. SFC v Kenneth Cheung and others [2012] HKCFI 312 (Styland Holdings);  
127  Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2012, Guideline 6.5; Hong Kong Corporate Governance 
Code, Principle A.1.6. 
128 Executive Directors of Sino-Environment Technology Group, ‘Response to the Independent Directors’, 
(Sino-Environment Technology Group, 23 November 2009 (copy on file with author). 
129  In another example, NEL Group, in response to the SGX’s reprimand for failing to announce the 
results of the special audit to the market, the independent directors have put forward, as mitigating 
circumstances, that one of the key reasons for the delay was the failure to agree on the special audit, which came 
up to S$1.5 million, a sharp increase from the original quote of S$500,000. See Audit Committee of NEL 
Group, ‘Audit Committee’s Response to SGX’s Reprimand’, (NEL Group, 30 May 2010) (copy on file with 
author).  
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able to diligently question management and auditors about the financial statements. As outlined 
in Section 2.1 above, prior literature has shown that mixed expertise in accounting, finance and 
supervisory improves the quality of financial reporting.  
5.2 Foreign Listings 
In Section 4, we have highlighted that there is no significant difference between foreign 
and locally-incorporated companies in respect of the propensity to commit fraud, whether 
pooled together or analysing each jurisdiction separately. However, there is significant 
difference between overseas mainland Chinese listed firms and non-overseas mainland Chinese 
listed firms in the propensity to commit fraud, whether pooled together or analysing Hong 
Kong and Singapore separately. This would suggest that firms with significant overseas 
principal subsidiaries and/or assets in the mainland China are significantly associated with 
fraud in the two markets.  
The results can be explained as follows. In the case of Hong Kong, the Companies 
Ordinance allows the investors of local and foreign-incorporated issuers to access the same 
shareholder-protection remedies relating to unfair prejudice or shareholder derivative actions, 
and the listing rules apply the Hong Kong standards of fiduciary duties to the listed firms,130 
and require foreign-incorporated companies to comply with a set of listing requirements to 
ensure that such companies offer equivalent level of shareholder protection to those provided 
in Hong Kong.131  
However, for overseas mainland Chinese listed firms (and companies with significant 
operations in jurisdictions outside the country of listing), irrespective of the country of 
incorporation, it is far more difficult to equivalise the protections for the minority shareholders. 
                                                          
130 Donald n 104, 155. 
131  SEHK listing rules, chapter 19 (for non-PRC companies) and chapter 19A for PRC companies. 
 39 
 
 
Certainly, it is difficult for the Hong Kong/ Singapore regulator to pursue criminal prosecution 
in Hong Kong or Singapore if the wrongdoer is based overseas. The only possible effective 
sanction is against the listed company (such as penalties or delisting or suspension of trading 
as in the case of Hanergy), which will end up adversely affecting minority shareholders.  
Regulatory attempts have been made in Hong Kong and Singapore to mitigate the 
problems of enforcement. There exist regulatory cooperation agreements for investigative 
assistance and exchange of information between mainland China and Hong Kong.132 Singapore 
and China (together with Hong Kong) are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (the MMOU) 
adopted by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in May 2002133.  
In 2006, the SGX listing rules were amended to require foreign issuers to have two 
independent directors resident in Singapore on a continuing basis on their boards.134  In 2011, 
specifically targeting S-Chips, the SGX required the articles of association of the key PRC 
subsidiaries of these issuers to include provisions to allow for the issuers to replace the legal 
representatives of these subsidiaries.135 These issuers were also required to engage auditors and 
legal professionals to assess whether the checks and balances are adequate. The measures by 
SGX follows the difficulties faced by the fraud-hit SGX-listed issuers136 and SEHK-listed 
                                                          
132  SFC, ‘Cooperation – Mainland China’ (SFC, 2016), <http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/about-the-
sfc/collaboration/mainland/> accessed 11 July 2017; See also F Huang, X Liu, and H Yeung, ‘Coordinated 
efforts to regulate overseas listed Chinese companies: a historical perspective and recent developments’ (2017) 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2017.1320023. See also D Donald, n 104, 251-254 
(giving examples of the difficulties of enforcement of securities fraud between mainland China and Hong 
Kong). 
133  See IOSCO, ‘Signatories to Appendix A and Appendix B List’ (IOSCO, 15 January 2017) 
<https://www.iosco.org/about/?subSection=mmou&subSection1=signatories> accessed 1 July 2017 
134  SGX listing rule amendments 2006, listing rule 221. 
135  SGX, “SIAS Safeguard Proposals for Investors of Foreign Issuers Listed on Singapore Exchange”, 18 
February 2013 < 
https://sias.org.sg/files/180213%20-%20Letter%20from%20SGX%20on%20SIAS%20safegaurd%20proposals
%20for%20investors%20of%20foreign%20issuers%20listed%20on%20Singapore%20Exchange.pdf> accessed 
1 July 2017. 
136  J Kwok, “Administrative complexities in China may throw up road blocks” Straits Times 5 December 
2011 (referring to the difficulties faced by Falmac and Sino-Environment Tech Group). 
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issuers137 in attempting to replace the legal representatives of PRC subsidiaries, who are vested 
with the power to act on behalf of the companies. However, efficacy of these reforms, which 
are still untested, will ultimately depend on whether the local PRC courts will give effect to 
removal of the legal representatives. 138  Despite lobbying by the Securities Investors 
Association of Singapore (SIAS), a body representing the retail investors, SGX declined to 
introduce more aggressive forms of dealing with foreign issuers, such as disallowing 
companies to list if they come from jurisdictions with no reciprocal enforcement and/or 
extradition treaty with Singapore, on the ground that it would be detrimental to the development 
of the capital markets.  
In 2013, the SGX and China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) set up a 
direct listing framework, which allows PRC-incorporated companies that have obtained 
approvals from CSRC and SGX, to list directly on SGX.139 These companies will have to 
comply with the laws and regulation in China and Singapore, and will be subject to the 
regulatory processes in both jurisdiction, providing greater assurance for the investors. 140 
However, to date there is no reported case of a company taking advantage of the direct listing 
framework.  
Thus, enforcement, both public and private, may continue to prove difficult without the 
cooperation of Chinese regulatory authorities (particularly outside the direct listing framework) 
and there is no certainty nor clarity that such cooperation will take place when an investigation 
                                                          
137  For an example of the difficulties faced when the provisional liquidators of the SEHK-listed issuer 
attempted to replace the legal representative of a PRC subsidiary, see SFC v Yeung Chung Lung [2017] HKCU 
419 (Re First Natural Foods).  
138  See n J Kwok, “Administrative complexities in China may throw up road blocks” Straits Times 5 
December 2011 (referring to the difficulties faced by Falmac and Sino-Environment Tech Group). 
139  SGX, ‘SGX and China Securities Regulatory Commission establishing direct listing framework’ 
(2013) 
<http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/sgx_en/home/higlights/news_releases/SGX+and+China+Securities+Re
gulatory+Commission+establishing+direct+listing+framework> accessed 1 July 2017. 
140  See HX Cai, ‘New, direct route for China firms seeking Singapore listing’ Business Times (Singapore, 
26 November 2013). 
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is conducted. For example, as of 2016, the only S-Chip scandal in Singapore that was 
successfully concluded with remedial measures (albeit indirectly) to the shareholders was 
China Sky (an S-Chip), where the MAS undertook enforcement action against the controlling 
shareholder, who ultimately surrendered his 10% shareholding to China Sky (thereby 
increasing the net asset value of the company), and this arrangement was only possible with 
the assistance of the Chinese authorities.141 Almost a decade ago, in an earlier high profile 
corporate scandal involving China Aviation Oil (CAO) (which is not an S-Chip but is a 
Singapore subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned enterprise), the parent company, which had 
committed insider trading, agreed to transfer to minority shareholders of CAO the shares in 
CAO that it was due to receive under a debt-equity swap that was agreed to under a scheme of 
arrangement by CAO’s creditors. Although this is an instance of insider trading which is 
technically outside the scope of this article, the example is given to show that this arrangement 
which benefits the investors was only possible with the assistance of Chinese authorities.142 
In Hong Kong, the SFC had to commence legal action against the Hong Kong auditors 
of an issuer which had made an application for listing on the SEHK, which has operations in 
mainland China, to compel the production of certain accounting records. The Hong Kong 
auditors had resisted the application on various grounds, arguing that the audit was performed 
by its mainland Chinese affiliate and pursuant to state secrecy under PRC Law Guarding State 
Secrets, the records could not be produced without the consent of the relevant Chinese 
                                                          
141  Monetary Authority of Singapore, ‘Opinion Editorial on Achieving a Robust and Vibrant Securities 
Market’ Straits Times (Singapore, 26 June 2015); MAS, ‘Former China Sky CEO Huang Zhong Xuan pays civil 
penalty of $2.5 million and offers to surrender 10% of his shareholdings in China Sky’ (MAS, 12 February 
2015), <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/enforcement-actions/2015/china-sky.aspx> accessed 1 
July 2017. See L Khoo, “Ex-CEO China Sky to pay civil penalty of S$2.5m, give up 10% of shareholding” 
Business Times (Singapore, 12 February 2015) (quoting an MAS officer that this was a “first negotiated 
settlement of its kind”). 
 
142  C Milhaupt and K Pistor, “The China Aviation Oil Episode: Law and Development in China and 
Singapore”. Law and Economics with Chinese Characteristics Institutions for Promoting Development in the 
Twenty-First Century (David Kennedy and Joseph E. Stiglitz eds, 2013). 
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authorities.143  In the end, the auditors failed to establish that the documents were protected 
under the state secrecy and the documents were ultimately produced to the SFC. However, 
there is suggestion in various aspects of the case that the CSRC had worked behind the scenes 
to ensure that the documents would be produced to the SFC and there is no indication that such 
cooperation will be forthcoming in future cases.144 This case illustrates the difficulties faced by 
the Hong Kong regulators in securing evidence of non-compliance from the auditors or other 
professionals in building the case against the errant issuers or their management.  
Finally, there is the question of actual service of enforcement proceedings on the errant 
directors, who are located outside the jurisdiction of listing. In both Hong Kong and Singapore, 
the problem is partially addressed by the availability of the broad injunction orders available 
to the regulators under section 213 of the SFO (Hong Kong) and section 326 of the SFA 
(Singapore) to freeze the assets of the errant directors in the relevant jurisdiction. Once the 
injunction is taken out against the directors, the errant directors are incentivised to settle with 
the securities regulator. The examples of successful settlement of the cases, in GOME (Hong 
Kong), Greencool (Hong Kong) and China Sky (Singapore) involve not only cooperation of 
the mainland authorities but also the freezing orders. However, in the absence of assets within 
the jurisdiction of listing, enforcement will prove difficult. In the recent case of Hanergy, it is 
not entirely certain whether the SFC would have succeeded if the directors contested their 
disqualification orders as the SFC could not obtain the co-operation of the mainland banks in 
China to provide evidence to substantiate the SFC’s claims and the CSRC will not be able to 
assist as Hanergy is not listed in China and not subject to CSRC’s jurisdiction. 145  
                                                          
143  SFC v Ernst & Young [2014] HKCFI 931; [2015] 5 HKLRD 293; [2014] 3 HKC 406; HCMP 
1818/2012. The application was made under the SFO, s 185.  
144  E Yiu, “Beijing’s State Secrets Law Will Lead to Further Legal Disputes Unless Procedures 
Are Clarified”, South China Morning Post 28 July 2015, http://www.scmp.com/print/business/china-
business/article/1844099/sfc-wins-hong-kong-case-againstey-future-problems-loom. 
145  See also S Yam, “Civil Action Against Hanergy Shows SFC is just a chained lion” South China 
Morning Post (24 January 2017). 
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As such, in the sample of overseas mainland Chinese listed firms in the dataset, we 
examine the prospectuses and virtually all of them contain statements along the following lines 
in the disclosure to the risk factors: 
Our subsidiary, subsidiary entity, operations and significant assets are located in the 
PRC. In addition, most of our Executive Officers and our Executive Chairman and Non-
executive Directors are nonresidents of Singapore, and substantially all the assets of 
these persons are located outside Singapore. As a result, it would be difficult for 
investors to effect service of process in Singapore, or to enforce a judgement obtained 
in Singapore against any of these persons or us [the company].146 
 
6. Independent Directors, Enforcement and Incentives to Monitor 
  
6.1 Enforcement 
Finally, why has fraud has continued to occur despite the increase in board independence since 
the corporate governance reforms effected post-Asian financial crisis? To answer this question, 
we investigate whether the legal regime fully deter independent directors from failure of 
oversight which contributes to the fraud? We assume that the independent directors have not 
been parties to the fraud and their failing lies in failure of oversight or breach of the duty of 
care. In this regard, we look at private and public enforcement against errant independent 
directors. We have the initial dataset of 97 firms, and we further extend our research to 
enforcement actions found in the case law databases, regulatory websites and major financial 
press for two more years immediately prior to and after our initial sample period, that is, 2005-
2006 and 2015-2016. Thus, for the purposes of this section, our expanded dataset comprises 
122 firms where public or private enforcement actions have been undertaken against the 
fraudulent companies.  
                                                          
146  Language taken from the prospectus of Oriental Century (2006), which was incorporated in Singapore 
and is an S-Chip. See n 96 above.  
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Singapore and Hong Kong allow for statutory derivative actions to be brought against 
directors of publicly listed companies for breach of duty, including breach of the duty of care 
and skill.147 Our searches show that for private enforcement, only a minority of cases (one in 
Hong Kong and none in Singapore) resulted in reported statutory derivative claims brought 
against independent directors of listed companies for breach of duty of care, skill and diligence. 
The results are unsurprising given the low levels of statutory derivative actions brought against 
directors (even including executive directors).148 The reasons for the lack of the use of actual 
private enforcement mechanism can be attributed to the collective action problem faced by 
shareholders, the lack of an active plaintiffs’ attorneys bar and the rule that costs follow the 
events.149 We have excluded actions for oppression as independent directors are unlikely to 
have sufficient influence to bring about oppression of minority shareholders. 
As regards public enforcement, Singapore enforces breaches of directors’ duties 
through public prosecution, and in Hong Kong, enforcement of directors’ duties are largely 
carried out by the SFC through the exercise of section 213 and/or 214 of the SFO. 150  
Additionally, the independent directors may be liable for the making of false or misleading 
statements or disclosures, or for withholding of material disclosures, to the stock exchanges.151 
Stock exchanges may also issue reprimands or censures or demand that the companies and/or 
                                                          
147  For Singapore, see also MS Wee and Puchniak D, ‘Singapore Derivative Actions: Mundanely Non-
Asian, Intriguingly Non-American and at the Forefront of the Commonwealth’ in The Derivative Action in Asia: 
A Comparative and Functional Approach, 323 (Dan W. Puchniak et al eds, Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
For Hong Kong, see Mezanotte FE (2017) ‘The unconvincing rise of the statutory derivative action in Hong 
Kong: evidence from its first 10 years of enforcement’, n 65. 
148 Ibid.  
149  See WY Wan, ‘Civil Liabilities for False or Misleading Statements Made by Listed Companies to the 
Securities Market in Singapore’ (2008) 26 Company and Securities Law Journal 377; S Tang, ‘Rethinking the 
‘Theory in Books’ for Derivative Actions: Evidence from Singapore and Hong Kong,’ copy on file with author. 
150  See D Donald and P Cheuk, ‘ Hong Kong’s Public Enforcement Model of Investor Protection’, (2017) 
4 Asian Journal of Law and Society 349; WY Wan, ‘Civil Liabilities for False or Misleading Statements Made 
by Listed Companies to the Securities Market in Singapore’, ibid. 
151  See WY Wan et al, n 147. 
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directors undertake compliance training.152 Directorial disqualifications may also result.153 In 
our sample of 122 fraud cases, only 22 of these cases involved public enforcement actions 
against the independent directors. Out of these 22 cases, only six instances involve the bringing 
of proceedings that lead to financial penalties and/or directorial disqualification; the balance 
16 cases involve stock exchange reprimands or criticisms (which do not lead to financial 
penalties). In the vast majority of the cases, actions are brought against the executive directors 
for the fraud or breach of duty of care, skill and diligence. For example, in the two leading 
cases involving fraud in Hong Kong, First China Financial and Rontex International Holdings, 
only executive directors (who were not the beneficiaries of the fraud) were subject of public 
enforcement actions for breach of duty of care, skill and diligence.154  
In reviewing the six cases, we find that criminal prosecutions or financial penalties 
against independent directors exist but are generally rare and not easy to establish. In Singapore, 
two were high-profile prosecutions against independent directors; first, in the Airocean case, 
three independent directors were prosecuted for, among other things, breach of directors’ duties 
for failure of oversight and the making of false or misleading statement to the securities market, 
but all of them were either acquitted or had their convictions quashed. 155  Second, two 
independent directors were prosecuted and convicted for breach of directors’ duties for failure 
to disclose a change in control of the company, and were subject to fines and disqualification 
for two years.156  
                                                          
152  See WY Wan et al, n 147 
153  Ibid. 
154  SFC v Yin Yingneng Richard and others [2015] HKCFI 56 (First China Financial);  SFC v Cheung 
Keng Ching and others CACV91/2010 (Rontex). 
155  Ong Chow Hong v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1093 (the independent director was convicted for breach of 
directors’ duties but his conviction was subsequently quashed because in the related case of Madhavan v PP, the 
other independent directors were acquitted on appeal); Madhavan v PP [2012] 4 SLR 613 (the two independent 
directors were convicted for non-disclosure and misleading disclosures but they were acquitted on appeal). See 
“Judge Sets Aside Former Airocean Chairman’s Conviction” Today 17 October 2014. 
156  See A Chan, “Should Failing to Act Diligently be a Crime?” Business Times, 18 April 2014 (in 
connection with the prosecution of the independent directors of Chan Soon Huat). This is outside our sample 
period as the fraud was discovered in 2006.  
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In Hong Kong, recent examples show that independent directors do face an increased 
risk of sanctions leading to financial penalties and/or disqualification but only in connection 
with the making of false or misleading statement or non-disclosure to the securities market. In 
the recent cases which occur in 2015-2016, enforcement proceedings of an administrative 
nature were taken out against independent directors. First, the chairman of the board of 
AcrossAsia (who was an INED) was subject to a regulatory fine of HK$800,000, in connection 
with the failure to disclose promptly inside information relating to an Indonesian subsidiary.157 
Second, in SFC enforcement proceedings against Mayer Holdings and its directors, the three 
INEDs were subject to disqualification orders and regulatory fines of HK900,000 for failure to 
procure the company to disclose promptly inside information relating to the audit issues. 158 
More recently, SFC took enforcement proceedings against two INEDs of Greencool 
Technology Holdings before the Market Misconduct Tribunal, though they were later found 
not to have acted recklessly or negligently in authorising the publication of misleading financial 
statements.159  Likewise, in Hanergy, the SFC obtained disqualification orders against the 
INEDs in respect of various breaches, including lack of care and skill and disclosure failures.160  
6.2 Incentives and Ability of Independent Directors to Monitor 
                                                          
157  SFC, ‘AcrossAsia Limited: Notice to the Market Misconduct Tribunal pursuant to Section 307I(2) and 
Schedule 9 to the Securities and Futures Ordinance issued by the Securities and Futures Commission’ (MMT, 22 
July 2015) < http://www.mmt.gov.hk/eng/rulings/AcrossAsia_Ltd%20_22072015_e.pdf> accessed 1 July 2017. 
158  SFC, ‘Mayers Holdings Limited: Notice to the Market Misconduct Tribunal pursuant to section 307(2) 
of and Schedule 9 to the Securities and Futures Ordinance’ (MMT, 4 March 2016). 
<http://www.mmt.gov.hk/eng/rulings/Mayer.Holdings.Ltd.04032016_e.pdf> accessed 1 July 2017. 
159  MMT, ‘The report of the Market Misconduct Tribunal into dealings in the shares of Greencool 
Technology Holdings Limited between 2001 and 2005, 
http://www.mmt.gov.hk/eng/reports/Greencool_Technology_Holdings_Limited_Report_e.pdf/> accessed 1 July 
2017. 
160  SFC, ‘SFC seeks court orders against former and current directors of Hanergy Thin Film Power Group 
Limited’ (SFC, 23 January 2017) < https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=17PR12> accessed 18 July 2017. In the case of Hanergy, as part of the 
negotiations relating to the resumption of trading, the SFC would allow the resumption only if, among other 
things, the five directors (including the four INEDs) did not challenge disqualification orders proposed by the 
SFC.  
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In jurisdictions with dispersed shareholdings, the solution of addressing the agency 
conflicts between the shareholders and professional managers (and shareholders’ coordination 
costs) is to have independent directors appointed by shareholders to monitor the managers. 
Shareholders can vote out non-performing directors.  However, we find that the solution may 
not work so well in jurisdictions with concentrated shareholdings. Even though in Hong Kong 
and Singapore, the directors of public listed companies can be removed by ordinary 
resolution,161 independent directors are ultimately elected by the controlling shareholders and 
can only be removed with the consent of controlling shareholders.  The agency problem is one 
of the conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders, not between the shareholders 
and the professional managers. As a result, independent directors in controlled companies have 
significant incentives to side with the controllers and there are insufficient countervailing 
incentives to protect the minority shareholders since the minority shareholders are unable to 
elect or remove them from office.162  
In Hong Kong and Singapore, there are reported examples where independent directors 
are threatened with removal if they do not side with the existing controlling shareholders.163 
However, even without the threats, these incentives exist even if the law and regulation require 
that they are independent from the controlling shareholders. In addition, the largest firms often 
operate as conglomerates, often with similar controlling shareholders. If the independent 
directors regularly disagree with the controllers, they will find that they will be shut out of not 
only the current boards that they sit on, but also other companies which are affiliated with the 
controllers. If the independent directors do not go along with the controllers’ wishes, their only 
                                                          
161  Shareholders can remove directors at will with a 50% majority of votes: see Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance, s 462; this is also required under the SEHK listing rules which apply to the foreign firms listed in 
Hong Kong: see SEHK listing rules, Appendix 3, para 4(3); Singapore Companies Act, s 152. 
162  See LA Bebchuk and A Hamdani, ‘Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders’ 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741738> accessed 1 July 2017. 
163  M Quah, ‘Automated Touchstone independent director ousted’, Business Times (Singapore, 21 April 
2007); LS Siow, ‘Rift between Stanley Tan and directors far from over’  Business Times (Singapore, 28 June 
2007). 
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realistic alternative is to resign. The case studies in our dataset lend support to the media’s 
assertion that resignation is the choice of independent directors to get out of difficult 
positions.164  For example, in the case of China Sky Chemical Fibre (Singapore), a company in 
our dataset, the independent directors who were unable to get the executive directors to comply 
with the stock exchange’s direction for special audit resigned. In First China Financial Network 
Holdings, the court found that one of the independent non-executive directors resigned when 
he was not able to receive assurances relating to the proposed improper payment of monies that 
benefit one of the directors.165  
It may be argued that good independent directors have interests in safeguarding their 
reputation, and will do their assigned monitoring tasks diligently, and not be biased towards 
the controlling shareholders. In particular, when they are approving (or recommending to 
shareholders the approval of) RPTs or other conflicted transactions, they should be vigilant 
against abuses. Certainly, the independence requirements under the current regulation and their 
interests in preserving their reputation will reduce instances in which they side with the 
controllers. However, reputation alone may not completely eliminate the inherent bias and such 
bias is not easily detectable since the details of the deliberations of the boards or its committees 
are not publicly disclosed. It is very rare for the independent directors to depart from the rest 
of the board on the approval of these conflicted transactions.166  
                                                          
164  Y Ong, ‘More resignations at China Sky’ Straits Times (Singapore, 1 May 2012); Other Singapore 
examples are cited in Michelle Quah, ‘Time to update governance practices’ Business Times (Singapore, 20 
October 2009); See also SGX, ‘SGX Directs Delisting of FM Holdings Limited from Catalist’, (SGX, 29 July 
2010) < http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-69RPAC/4823572981x0x481732/B458FCBE-D8A6-
4876-931B-8B920004DD2F/SGX_News_2010_7_29_General_Releases.pdf> accessed 1 July 2017 (SGX 
citing the resignation of the independent directors on the grounds of lack of transparency by management). For 
Hong Kong, see V Bath, ‘Independent directors in Hong Kong’ (2018) (forthcoming) in DW Puchniak, H 
Baum, and L Nottage (eds), Independent Directors in Asia: A Historical, Contextual and Comparative 
Approach (Cambridge University Press). 
165  SFC v Yin Yingneng Richard [2015] HKCFI 56 (First China Financial Network Holdings). 
166  A rare example is cited by David Webb, ‘Chung Tai Printing: INED Alfred Au Yan to step down at 
AGM’ (Webb-site, 30 July 2009)  <https://webb-site.com/dbpub/subject.asp?t=31> accessed 1 July 2017 
(involving a 2009 transaction of Chung Tai Holdings where the independent director dissented from the rest of 
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In order to give a greater voice to the independent directors, and as a result of the 
problems that arose from foreign listed firms on the LSE,167 one may look to the UK. In the 
UK, reforms have been adopted to enhance the protection of the minority shareholders in 
respect of their election of independent directors. In 2014, the UK’s Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) adopted new listing rules which were aimed at improving the governance of 
premium listed controlled firms. Election and re-election of independent directors are subject 
to a dual-voting structure; the independent director’s election requires approval of both the 
majority of shareholders and a majority of minority shareholders. 168  If the minority 
shareholders reject a candidate, the controlling shareholder can either stick to the original 
candidate or put forward a new candidate 90 days later, at which time the approval of majority 
of shareholders is required. While the FCA recognises that this will ultimately allow the wishes 
of the controlling shareholder to prevail, the vote of the independent shareholders will give 
them a greater voice. 
7 Conclusion 
Corporate boards play a central role in corporate governance and corporate fraud 
exemplifies the failure in corporate governance. Post-Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 
regulatory response was to increase the independence of the boards and their monitoring 
abilities. In fact, Hong Kong has been more stringent than the UK (or Singapore) approach in 
respect of certain aspects of the independent director regime; it did not apply the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach towards the definition of independence (instead, this is contained in the 
listing rules which are mandatory).  
                                                          
the board). The announcement of Chung Tai Printing indicating the dissent of the INED is available at 
<http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2009/0616/LTN20090616470.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2017. 
167  See Barker R and Chiu H-Y “Protecting minority shareholders in blockholder-controlled companies— 
critically evaluating the UK’s enhanced listing regime in comparison with investor protection 
regimes in New York and Hong Kong” (2005) 10  Capital Markets L J 98. 
168  The UK Listing Rules (Listing Regime Enhancements) Instrument 2014, s 9.2.2E. 
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However, the wave of corporate fraud cases that are discovered post-financial crisis of 
2007/2008 raises the issue of the effectiveness of these reforms in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
which are dominated by companies with controlling shareholders and foreign listings. We find 
that there are limited differences in the corporate governance characteristics between the 
fraudulent and the non-fraudulent firms, except in the areas of the separation of CEO and 
chairman, and the promotion of non-accounting financial expertise on audit committees. In 
relation to the former, in Singapore, a step is taken closer to require stronger separation: with 
effect from 2016, the Code of Corporate Governance requires half of the board to be 
independent where the chairman and CEO are the same person or are closely related, or where 
the chairman is not independent. While these incremental improvements may be made, any 
comprehensive reforms will need to take into account several other factors. In particular, we 
argue that RPTs pose significant concerns to minority shareholders and independent directors 
are limited in their ability to monitor RPTs in view of the fact that they depend on the senior 
management (appointed by the controlling shareholders) to surface the information to the board. 
In this regard, audit committees may benefit from having non-accounting financial expertise 
on audit committees.  
We have shown that foreign listings in the two jurisdictions pose significant challenges 
in regulation. Our study demonstrates the difficulties in the boards of the listed issuers taking 
control of mainland Chinese subsidiaries when fraud is discovered, as well as the enforcement 
of proceedings against the errant directors. However, as the Singapore example demonstrates, 
the SGX is reluctant to put in strong deterrent measures due to the concern of losing its 
competitive edge of attracting foreign listings to the markets.  
Finally, regard should also be made of putting in place the appropriate incentives for 
the independent directors to discharge their duties properly; independent directors face only a 
small (though not zero) threat of public and private enforcement actions. Independent directors 
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are ultimately elected by, and can only be removed only with the consent of, controlling 
shareholders. The question is ripe as to it may be appropriate to introduce the UK reforms, 
which allow the independent shareholders to have some say in the vote for the independent 
directors, in the two jurisdictions.     
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Board Size 7.49 7.00 2.232 3 16 
CEO_Large 47.58% 0 0.501 0 1 
Chair_Large 60.48% 1 0.491 0 1 
Founder_Large 53.23% 1 0.501 0 1 
Duality 41.94% 0 0.495 0 1 
INED 43.31% 42.86% 0.126 16.67% 1 
AC_INED 92.82% 1 0.158 0 1 
AC_FINA 29.22% 0.33 0.281 0 1 
Total Asset 210.319 72.65 646.1886 2.52 6218.90 
ROA 29.01 21.32 29.823 1.28 215.39 
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Table 2 
 
Breakdown on Number of Fraudulent Cases by Type of Violation 
 
Fraud Type Number of Occurrences Proportion to Fraud Cases* 
Accounting fraud 20 32.26% 
Disclosure failure 45 72.58% 
Misappropriation of assets/cash 19 30.65% 
   
Total 84  
 
There are a total of 62 fraud companies in our sample. A case may identify more than one kind of fraud, so the 
total number of occurrences is more than 62. 
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Table 3 Differences in board composition characteristics between Fraudulent and Non-
fraudulent firms 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non_Fraudulent 
Firms 
Fraudulent 
Firms 
Fraudulent Firms - 
Non_Fraudulent 
Firms 
p-values for 
Differences 
N=62 N=62   
Control Group 
Treatment 
group 
Treatment-Control 
  
Board Size 7.66 7.32 -0.34 0.400 
(s.e.) (0.294) (0.274) (0.401)  
CEO_Large 46.77% 48.38% 1.61% 0.857 
(s.e.) (0.063) (0.063) (0.090)  
Chair_Large 59.68% 61.29% 1.61% 0.854 
(s.e.) (0.062) (0.062) (0.088)  
Founder_Large 50.00% 56.45% 6.45% 0.472 
(s.e.) (0.064) (0.063) (0.090)  
Duality 33.87% 50.00% 16.13%* 0.069 
(s.e.) (0.060) (0.064) (0.089)  
INED 42.23% 44.38% 2.15% 0.345 
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023)  
AC_INED 93.04% 92.61% -0.43% 0.880 
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.023) (0.028)  
AC_FINA 34.11% 24.33% -9.78%** 0.03 
(s.e.) (0.034) (0.036) (0.050)   
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
